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ORACLE V. GOOGLE: SETTING A STANDARD OR HANDICAPPING AN
INDUSTRY?
Tyler J. Demasky*
For years the world of software programming has been
operating under the assumption that both the declaration code and
the structure, sequence, and organization (SSO) of Java
application program interfaces (APIs) were not copyrightable and
were therefore free for all to use. However, when Oracle sued
Google in 2014 for Google’s use of Java APIs in the Android
Operating System (OS), the Federal Circuit held that the
declaration code and the SSO of APIs are protected by copyright,
and remanded the case back to the district court. The jury found in
favor of Google—who had to rely on a “fair use” defense—and
Oracle again appealed to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit
should affirm the jury’s verdict because the district court’s
interpretation of the statutory factors align more closely with the
nature of software programming. Further, reversing the jury’s
verdict could potentially set a negative, restrictive precedent and
have detrimental effects on the software industry.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The law often has to play catch-up with modern changes in
society. This catch-up is perhaps most prominent in intellectual
property and technology. However, the Federal Circuit1 has a
chance to bridge the gap. In 2010, Oracle sued Google for
copyright infringement of Java “application program interfaces”
(“APIs”) owned by Oracle in Google’s Android operating system

1

See infra Part IV. Section B. explaining the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.
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(“OS”).2 The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court
to be retried on the basis that APIs are copyrightable,3 where
Google successfully defended its use of APIs under the “fair use”
doctrine.4
Oracle has again appealed to the Federal Circuit,5 and the court
will consider a potentially significant and impactful decision.
Upholding the jury verdict could potentially set a new, more liberal
test for “fair use” when dealing with software programming,6
which in turn could help lessen the gap between law and
technology. Reversing the decision could have the opposite effect,
resulting in more stringent copyright laws and debilitating
innovation for an entire industry.
This Recent Development examines the implications of a
Federal Circuit ruling by proceeding in six parts. Part II provides
an overview of the “fair use” doctrine and its historical
interpretations. Part III introduces and explains Java, Java APIs,
and how copyright law attaches to the literal and non-literal
elements of APIs. Part IV addresses the history of the case, both
inside and outside of court. Part V first analyzes the current verdict
and addresses why the district court’s verdict should be affirmed. It
then assesses what reversing the verdict could mean legally, and
how that might affect the software industry in particular. Finally,
Part VI concludes by reiterating the possible consequences of
Oracle’s appeal to the Federal Circuit on the cloudy area of
software copyright law.

2

See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 975 (N.D. Cal.
2012).
3
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
4
See Final Judgment, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-10-03561 WHA
(N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016).
5
See Notice of Appeal to the Fed. Cir. by Oracle Am., Inc., docket number
3:10-cv-03561, entry # 2071, filed on 10/26/2016.
6
See infra Part V. Section A.1.
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II.
HISTORICAL “FAIR USE”
According to the Copyright Act of 1976, determining whether
use of a work is “fair use” involves the consideration of several
factors, including the following:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes (“purpose”);
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work (“nature”);
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole (“amount”);
and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work (“market effect”).7
While the Copyright Act lays out these four factors, it does not
define them.8 Defining the factors, or even contributing additional
factors, is left to the courts.9 It is “an equitable rule of reason,”10
meaning that results may vary, causing some to refer to the “fair
use” defense as “the most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law
of copyright.”11 Different courts may weigh factors differently, and
some courts may even weigh factors differently from case to
case.12 This section discusses “fair use” by focusing on: (A) the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of fair use in Sony Corporation of
7

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
Id.
9
See Final Charge to the Jury (Phase One) & Special Verdict Form, at 12,
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-10-03561 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 8,
2016) (“[T]he statute includes several examples of some types of uses that may
be found to be fair uses, but that list is not exhaustive or exclusive.”) [hereinafter
Final Charge].
10
Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)). An equitable rule of reason
means that the doctrine is fact based, and an accurate application of the doctrine
requires a case-by-case analysis. See id.
11
Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
12
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 44851, 454-55 (1984); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-68; Sega Enters. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-27 (9th 1992).
8
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America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.13 and Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,14 and (B) the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit’s (“Ninth Circuit”) application of Supreme
Court guidance in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc.15
A. The Supreme Court’s “Fair Use” Interpretations
In Sony Corporation of America,16 the Supreme Court held that
Sony’s Betamax17 tapings of previously broadcasted television
programming constituted fair use, putting the emphasis most
heavily on the first statutory factor (purpose), followed
respectively by the fourth (market effect), and third (amount).18
Sony produced and sold Betamax, a home video tape recorder,
which allowed customers to record television programs.19
Universal Studios sued Sony for copyright infringement based on
Sony’s customers using Betamax to record Universal Studios’
televised copyrighted broadcasts, and Sony raised a “fair use”
defense.20 The district court held in favor of Sony, but the appellate
court reversed.21 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
reversed the appellate court’s decision, holding for Sony.22
The Supreme Court appeared to put the most emphasis on the
first factor (purpose).23 Most notably, the Court addressed the fact
that the primary use for the Betamax tapes was private home use,
which “must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit
activity.24 Because the purpose was for private, personal viewing in
one’s home at a later time, the Court felt there was a presumption

13

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-68.
15
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1521-27.
16
Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55.
17
Betamax was a home video tape recorder produced by Sony. Id. at 422.
18
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-51, 454-55.
19
Id. at 419.
20
Id. at 420, 424.
21
Id. at 420.
22
Id. at 421.
23
Sony, 464 U.S. at 449.
24
Id.
14
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of fairness in the use.25 Additionally, the Court’s decision was
based on the fact that because the nature of the public broadcasts
invited those customers to watch the programs in their entirety free
of charge, it had no demonstrable effect on Universal’s potential
market.26
Just one year later, in Harper & Row,27 the Supreme Court held
that The Nation’s (“Nation”) verbatim copying of excerpts from
former President Ford’s unpublished memoirs did not constitute
fair use.28 Instead, the Court placed the weight of its decision on
the fourth statutory factor (market effect), followed respectively by
the third (amount) and second (nature).29 Nation was a magazine
that had originally received the rights from Ford to license
prepublication excerpts from his memoirs and in turn negotiated
with Time Magazine for the opportunity for Time to publish those
excerpts.30
After negotiations, Nation obtained a leaked copy of the
memoir and published a piece containing an excerpt of some 300400 words comprising verbatim quotes from the manuscript.31
Nation released the article just before the Time article was
supposed to print, “scooping”32 the Time article.33 As a result, Time
refused to pay the remaining balance negotiated for the excerpts.34
Nation sued to recover the balance, but the district court held for
Time, stating that a copyright protected the Ford memoirs, and
Nation infringed upon that copyright.35 The court of appeals

25

Id.
Id. at 450.
27
See Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560-68 (1985).
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
Id. at 542-53.
31
Id. at 543, 548.
32
Id. at 542 (implying that “scooping” means to take the newsworthiness of
the information away from the Time article, rendering it less impactful and thus
potentially reducing marketability of the article).
33
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
34
See id. at 543.
35
Id. at 543-44.
26
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reversed, stating that Nation’s publication was “fair use,” but the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed that holding.36
Contrary to the Sony case, the Court in Harper & Row, held
“[the fourth] factor is undoubtedly the single most important
element of ‘fair use,’”37 because, to be applied properly, fair use
must be “limited to copying by others which does not materially
impair the marketability of the work which is copied.”38 Like in the
Sony case, a showing of adverse effect on the potential market
could negate the “fair use.”39 The Court reasoned that the relevant
market in this case was to be the first to release new information
on Ford, which is what Time intended to do.40 Nation’s publishing
of the excerpts before Time, which could be recognized as Ford
speaking and not Nation,41 “directly competed for a share of the
market for prepublication excerpts.”42
For the third and second factors, ordered according to the
weight given to them by the Court, the focus was on the qualitative
amount of copyrighted work used, rather than the quantitative
amount,43 and the nature of that work.44 Nation verbatim published
a small quantitative amount of the manuscript, but captured “what
was essentially the heart” of the work.45 An editor of Time stated
that the chapters quoted were “the most interesting and moving
parts of the entire manuscript” and were “the most powerful
passages in those chapters.”46 The Court noted that “[t]he fact that

36

Id. at 542, 544.
Id. at 566.
38
Id. at 566-567 (quoting Melvill B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright, § 1.10[D] at 1-87 (Rev. Ed. 2011)).
39
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
40
Id. at 603.
41
Id. at 568.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 565.
44
See id. at 563.
45
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting Harper & Row, Publrs. v.
Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
46
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
37
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a work is unpublished is a critical element of its ‘nature,’” and that
the scope of “fair use” should be narrowed in such cases.47
The Supreme Court’s position on the importance of each of the
factors appears ambiguous, offering little guidance to lower courts.
The Ninth Circuit confirmed this ambiguity in Sega v. Accolade,48
choosing to emphasize different statutory factors.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Fair Use Interpretations
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit held that Accolade’s breaking down
of Sega programming was fair use.49 The Ninth Circuit followed
the Supreme Court in Sony, putting the most weight on the first
statutory factor (purpose), followed by the fourth factor (market
effect), but went its own way by focusing additionally on the
second factor (nature).50 Accolade was attempting to manufacture
video games for various game consoles, but wanted compatibility
with the Sega Genesis system.51 To determine the compatibility
requirements, Accolade disassembled Sega video game software to
find the code needed for compatibility.52 It then copied the code
necessary for compatibility, but wrote its own procedures and
developed its own games.53 Sega sued for copyright infringement
of its code.54 The district court found for Sega, but the Ninth
Circuit reversed, saying Accolade’s use of the code was “fair
use.”55
The Ninth Circuit put a lot of weight on whether the use was
for commercial purposes.56 However, instead of looking at the
ultimate result of Accolade developing games to sell that were
compatible with the Genesis system, the court focused on
47

Id. at 564.
See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-27 (9th Cir. 1992).
49
See id. at 1527.
50
See id. at 1521-27.
51
Id. at 1514.
52
Id. at 1514-15.
53
Id. at 1515.
54
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1516.
55
See id. at 1517, 1527-28.
56
See id. at 1522.
48
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Accolade’s narrowed purpose of seeking to understand the
functional requirements of the Genesis system.57 Because this was
an educational purpose, the court concluded that Accolade’s use
was “for a legitimate, essentially non-exploitative purpose” and
could thus be described as being of “minimal significance”
commercially.58 The court then tied the purpose and character to
the fourth factor: the effect on the potential market.59
No significant effect on the market was found in Sega because,
unlike in Harper & Row, Accolade was not attempting to “scoop”
Sega’s release of particular video games.60 Rather, Accolade
wanted to break into the market for Genesis-compatible video
games.61 The nature of video games is such that the purchasing of
one game of a specific type does not preclude the same consumer
from also purchasing a different game of the same or similar type.62
The court used a test63 from the Second Circuit to boil the nature of
the code down to the core ideas of the program to determine that
the copied code was mostly functional elements, weighing in favor
of fair use.64
The weight and focus of each statutory factor will differ
depending on the specifics of the case at bar, but it appears to be
possible for a court to place greater weight on one factor over
others. An appeal to the Federal Circuit could introduce the
possibility of factor rankings.65 However, in order to address the
implications of a Federal Circuit decision on “fair use” factors, the
next section first necessarily explains the technologies at issue in
Oracle v. Google: Java and Java APIs.

57

Id.
Id. at 1522-23.
59
Id. at 1523.
60
See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
See infra Part III. Section C.2.
64
Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-26.
65
See infra Part V. Section A.
58
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III.
JAVA
This section provides a background on Java by (A) explaining
the substance of Java, (B) describing the structure of Java, and (C)
demonstrating how copyright law applies to the structure and
organization of Java.
A. What is Java?
Java is a programming language initially developed and owned
by Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”).66 Like all programming
languages, Java has a combination of words, symbols, and other
units arranged according to specified syntax rules to create various
instructions.67 Generally, this is referred to as source code, the
version of a program that can be read by humans.68 However, Java
differs from other programming languages. Instead of the
computer directly interpreting Java source code into something the
computer can understand—binary machine code69—Java code is
first compiled into bytecode70 and then interpreted by a Java
Virtual Machine (“JVM”).71 The JVM is an executable program on
the computer that interprets the bytecode into machine code,
executing specific operations.72 This intermediate step allows the
Java code to be hardware/platform independent.73 The source code
66

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
See id. at 1348; see generally Monica Pawlan, Essentials of the Java
Programming
Language,
Part
1,
ORACLE
(March
1999),
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/index-138747.html (providing an
introduction to the Java programming language).
68
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1348.
69
Binary machine code is a collection of 0s and 1s that form instructions a
computing device can understand. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1347.
70
Bytecode is intermediate, machine-independent, object code that is the
result of a program compiling the inputted Java source code. See Java Bytecode,
TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/7866/java-bytecode (last
visited Nov. 17, 2016); see also Bill Venners, Bytecode Basics: A First Look at
the Bytecodes of the JavaVirtual Machine, JAVAWORLD, (Sep. 1, 1996, 1:00
AM),
http://www.javaworld.com/article/2077233/core-java/bytecodebasics.html.
71
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1348.
72
See id.
73
See id. at 1347.
67
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and the machine code are both generally “literal elements”74 of a
computer program.75
B. The Structure of Java Code
Programs work by calling specific operations to do different
tasks, and the codes for those specific operations are called
“Methods.”76 Those Methods, along with variables and other
elements on which the methods operate, make up different
“Classes.”77 At the broadest level, those Classes are organized into
“Packages.”78 There are two components to Packages: the
declaring code and the implementing code.79 The APIs at issue in
the Oracle v. Google case are Packages, the high-level, general
pieces of code.80 The district court analogized the structure as
follows: “Oracle’s collection of API packages is like a library,
each package is like a bookshelf in the library, each class is like a
book on the shelf, and each method is like a how-to chapter in a
book.”81 To continue the analogy, the declaring code would be like
the title of that how-to chapter, and the implementing code would
be the text of the chapter. This is the APIs’ SSO, and it is
considered a “non-literal element”82 of a computer program.83
APIs allow Java programmers to use prewritten programs to
build functions into their own Java applications, rather than having
to start over from scratch.84 As stated above, APIs consist of
74

See infra Part III. Section C.1.
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355.
76
See id. at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing Methods under
Lesson 2: Building Applications).
77
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing
Classes under Lesson 2: Building Applications).
78
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349; see also Pawlan, supra note 67 (describing
Packages under Lesson 2: Building Applications).
79
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349.
80
See Google’s Trial Brief at 1, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-1003561 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016).
81
Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1349.
82
See infra Part III. Section C.2.
83
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355-56.
84
Id. at 1349.
75
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declaring code and implementing code.85 The declaring code
identifies the method body and specifies inputs, names, and other
functionalities. For example, using the declaration “public static int
max(int x, int y)” signals the objective of returning the maximum
of x and y indicated between the parentheses.86 The code that
actually calculates the maximum value and returns it is called the
implementing code.87 The parties in Oracle v. Google are
specifically arguing about whether Google’s use of the declaring
code and SSO of the Java APIs was fair.88
C. Copyright Law and Java
This section addresses how copyright law applies to (1) literal
elements, and (2) non-literal elements of computer programs.
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection exists in
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression,” including literary works.89 Copyright protection does
not, however, exist for “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery . . . .”90 This
means the law protects the expression itself, rather than the
underlying idea.91 So for a particular program component to be
protected, it must qualify as an expression of an idea, not the idea
itself.92 If the expression of an idea were inseparable from the idea
85

Id.
See id. (indicating that “public” shows a general accessibility of the method,
“static” means the method can be called at any time, and “int” signifies the
method will return an integer).
87
See id. at 1350.
88
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 8.
89
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
90
17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
91
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1354.
92
See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys. 886 F.2d 1173, 1175
(9th Cir. 1989). For example, a “jeweled bee pin” would be an idea, and actually
creating a specific jeweled bee pin would be an expression of that idea. See
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971). The line between an idea and an expression is not always easy to draw.
See id. (“The critical distinction between ‘idea’ and ‘expression’ is difficult to
draw. As Judge Hand candidly wrote, ‘Obviously, no principle can be stated as
to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its
86
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itself—perhaps due to a limited number of ways to properly
express the idea—then the expression would not benefit from
copyright protection.93
1.

Literal Elements
Although it is generally understood that copyright protection
does not apply to names, titles, or short phrases,94 courts have
consistently held that copyright protection can apply to literal
elements of a computer program.95 In many cases, there are
numerous ways to write programs and different names for a
declaration.96 The various options demonstrate creativity in
choosing which declaration or specific method for executing a
program, qualifying those literal elements as expressions and
permitting them copyright protection.97
2.

Non-literal Elements
Partly for reasons similar to the literal elements above, courts
have construed SSOs as expressions and granted them copyright
protection.98 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit endorsed a three-step
“expression.”’”) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
93
See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175; see also Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Formula Int’l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
94
See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular 34, COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION NOT AVAILABLE FOR NAMES, TITLES, or SHORT PHRASES (Oct.
2015).
95
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355; see also Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982
F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992); Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175; Apple, 725
F.2d at 525.
96
See Apple, 725 F.2d at 525. When deciding copyrightability of declaration
codes, the Federal Circuit stated: “The [district court] failed to recognize,
however, that the relevant question for copyrightability purposes is not whether
the work at issue contains short phrases—as literary works often do—but,
rather, whether those phrases are creative.” See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1362. The
analysis here presented by the court is too formalistic for the field of computer
sciences, as it fails to consider the commonplace of certain declaration codes
within the field. But, copyrightability of APIs is for another court at another
time.
97
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1356; see also Apple, 725 F.2d at 525.
98
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1355; see also Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1175.
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test developed by the Second Circuit and adopted by several
circuits as another way to determine if non-literal elements are
expressions.99 The test is called an “abstraction-filtrationcomparison” test (“AFC test”), and it rejects both the “notion that
anything that performs a function is necessarily uncopyrightable”
and the notion that “once any separable idea can be identified in a
computer program everything else must be protectable expression,
on grounds that more than one idea may be embodied.”100 The test
is as follows:
In the abstraction step, the court “first breaks down the
allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts.”101
In the filtration step, the court “sifts out all non-protectable
material,” including ideas and “expression that is necessarily
incidental to those ideas.”102 In the final step, the court compares
the remaining creative expression with the allegedly infringing
program.103
In one swoop, this test addresses both a copyrightability
analysis and an infringement analysis.104 The next section describes
the role of literal and non-literal elements in the copyright
infringement case brought by Oracle against Google for Google’s
use of Java APIs.105
IV.
ORACLE V. GOOGLE: HISTORY AND HOLDINGS
This part introduces the history of the Oracle v. Google case by
discussing (A) what led to the initial case, (B) the district court and
Federal Circuit’s rulings in the initial case, and (C) the district
court’s ruling upon remand.

99

See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1357.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d
693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)).
104
Id. at 1357.
105
See supra Part III. Section B. for an explanation of Java APIs.
100
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A. Leading up to the Initial Oracle v. Google Case
In 2005, Google acquired Android Industries with the intent of
developing the Android mobile OS.106 Google initially tried to
license the use of Java from Sun, but negotiations eventually fell
through.107 Google continued to develop Android with the
assistance of Open Handset Alliance (“OHA”), using freely
available Java language and other open source materials.108 Google
created a three-layered system, which runs the Android OS,
utilizing open source code from existing sources, including Java
language API libraries available from the Apache Software
Foundation.109
The bottom layer of Google’s system—the core operating
system—utilizes the open source Linux kernel.110 For the middle
layer, Google developed its own virtual machine—“Dalvik”—to
execute programs in Java and other languages.111 The upper layer
consisted of API packages.112 Google wrote over one hundred of its
own API packages, but also used thirty-seven Java APIs relevant
to a smartphone platform for the Android OS.113 Google copied the
declaring code for those APIs verbatim, in order to allow
application developers to find those functionalities by the same
names used in Java within the Android OS.114
While Google admitted to copying the declaring code for the
APIs and the SSO of the packages reflected in the declaring
code,115 it “re-implemented” the APIs by writing and utilizing its
106

See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 2.
See id. at 3-4.
108
See id. at 4.
109
See id. at 4-5.
110
See id. at 5. The Linux kernel is the core of the Linux operating system, an
open source operating system developed by Linus Torvald. See Kernel
Definition, THE LINUX INFORMATION PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/kernel.html
(last visited Oct. 25, 2016); see also Linux Definition, THE LINUX INFORMATION
PROJECT, http://www.linfo.org/linuxdef.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
111
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 5.
112
See id.
113
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 5.
114
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1339, 1350-51.
115
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 8.
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own implementing code.116 In 2010, Oracle purchased Sun, and
almost immediately sued Google for copyright infringement based
on Android’s use of the thirty-seven Java APIs.117 Oracle was
asserting a patent infringement claim and copyright infringement
for the method declarations (literal elements) and SSO (non-literal
elements) of those API packages.118
B. District Court and Federal Circuit Results of the Initial
Oracle v. Google Case
The district court originally found no patent infringement and
held that APIs were not subject to copyright protection,119 but the
jury hung on Google’s fair use defense.120 The district court
concluded that the declaring code was uncopyrightable because it
employed short phrases, the idea and expression merged, and the
SSO was uncopyrightable as a “method of operation” under
§ 102(b) of the Copyright Act.121 Because the jury was unable to
reach a conclusion on the fair use defense, the court never
performed any fact finding on the defense for final judgment.122
Oracle appealed the district court’s decision to the Federal
Circuit.123 The decision was appealed to the Federal Circuit
because of the patent infringement claim, although Ninth Circuit
law governed the copyright claim.124
After de novo review,125 the Federal Circuit reversed the lower
court’s decision, holding that the declaring method and SSO of the
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See id. at 5.
See id. at 6-7.
118
See id. at 7.
119
See id.
120
See id. at 1352.
121
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1359.
122
Id. at 1377.
123
Id. at 1359.
124
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2015); see also Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353.
125
The standard of review was de novo because “‘[f]air use is a mixed
question of law and fact.’ Thus, while . . . findings of fact must be reviewed for
clear error under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Ninth
Circuit reviews the ultimate application of those facts de novo.” Oracle, 750
F.3d at 1373 (citations omitted).
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thirty-seven APIs were subject to copyright protection.126 Because
the district court never did any fact-finding on the fair use defense,
the Federal Circuit remanded the case back down to the district
court to decide on the fair use of the thirty-seven APIs according to
the Federal Circuit’s ruling that the APIs are copyrightable.127
Google filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, but was
ultimately denied and forced to return to the District Court for the
Northern District of California for a new trial.128
C. District Court Results from the Remanded Oracle v. Google
Case
Upon remand, Google once again raised a fair use defense
against Oracle’s copyright infringement claims, for which Oracle
was seeking $8.8 billion in damages from profits Oracle claimed
Google made from Android.129 The next section130 discusses the
district court’s interpretations of each of the fair use elements laid
out above.131 To the entertainment of those in attendance,132 each
126

See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1353, 1367.
Id. at 1377.
128
See Google, Inc. v. Oracle Am., Inc., 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4472 (2015).
129
Joe Mullin, Second Oracle v. Google Trial Could Lead to Huge Headaches
for
Developers,
ARSTECHNICA
(May
8,
2016,
7:00
AM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/05/round-2-of-oracle-v-google-is-anunpredictable-trial-over-api-fair-use.
130
See infra Part V. Section A.1.
131
See supra Part II.
132
See Twitter Collection of @SarahJeong, @Xor & @Swiftstories Oracle vs
Google
Coverage,
API
EVANGELIST
(May
10,
2016),
http://apievangelist.com/2016/05/10/twitter-collection-of-sarahjeong-xorswiftstories-oracle-vs-google-coverage. Tweets from the audience include: “it’s
fascinating that Oracle’s lawyer did the whole ‘WELL IT’S NOT LIKE IT’S A
PAINTING’
criticism
of
the
fair
use
defense
(9:09
AM,
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730067244365946881) . . . but are very
insistent that Java APIs are a creative work (9:09 AM
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730067349928169473) . . . buddy, it’s not
like
it’s
a
painting.”
(9:10
AM,
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730067453326168065); “You like Angry
Birds, right? That’s what Oracle hates. Angry Birds, and freedom.” (9:46 AM,
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730076505221439489); “I think both sides
have brought LITERAL PHYSICAL FILE CABINETS as visual aids to explain
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side presented their case, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Google, concluding that Google’s use of the thirty-seven Java APIs
and their SSOs constituted fair use.133
Oracle has filed an appeal of the verdict to the Federal
Circuit.134 As noted above,135 the next part will attempt to analyze
two potentially significant outcomes of that appeal and the
consequences that could result from each.
V.
RULING IMPLICATIONS
This part addresses the implications of a Federal Circuit ruling
by analyzing (A) potential consequences of an affirmation of the
District Court’s ruling on Google’s fair use and alternatively, (B)
potential consequences of a reversal of the District Court’s ruling
on Google’s fair use of the Java APIs.
A. What Affirming the Current Ruling Could Mean
To understand what an affirmation of the jury verdict by the
Federal Circuit could mean, it is important to address the outcome
of the jury trial. As mentioned above, the jury found in favor of
what
an
API
is
(9:56
AM,
https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730079061293195264) . . . he literally
opened the top drawer and pulled something out and waved it around to explain
(9:57 AM, https://twitter.com/sarahjeong/status/730079061293195264)” Sarah
Jeong, @sarahjeong, TWITTER (May 10, 2016); “Oracle attorney is in for the
challenge of his legal career: he is now trying to convince the jury that Java Is
Good.” (8:30 AM, https://twitter.com/xor/status/730057511974244352);
“Oracle attorney just held up a literal painting that has some Java code written
on
it
as
a
REAL
example
of
fair
use”
(9:00
AM,
https://twitter.com/xor/status/730064881852907520); “Judge Alsup just had to
read a dozen Android version names in the jury instructions. Some day you gotta
hear
a
federal
judge
list
desserts.”
(10:23
AM,
https://twitter.com/xor/status/730085890547023872) Parker Higgins, @xor,
TWITTER (May 10, 2016).
133
See Final Judgment, supra note 4.
134
Notice of Appeal to the Fed. Cir. by Oracle Am., Inc, No. 3:10-cv-03561,
entry
#
2071,
filed
on
10/26/2016,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3183383/e159d3de-ee97-4d0792df-db808e4a43c5.txt.
135
See supra Part I.
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Google.136 Jury deliberations are secret, but looking at how Judge
Alsup presented the case and the law to the jury provides an
understanding of the current ruling. This section proceeds by (1)
describing more specifically the current interpretations of the
statutory factors as charged to the jury and (2) why these
interpretations should be affirmed.
1.

The Statutory Factors as Charged to the Jury
While it is impossible to know exactly how the jury weighed
each fair use statutory factor, Judge Alsup’s137 instructions to the
jury in the district court show how he felt the four factors should
be weighed.138 According to Judge Alsup, the fourth statutory
factor (market effect) is the “single most important statutory
factor,”139 followed by the first (purpose) and then third (amount)
factors.140 This is yet again a different order from the cases
above.141 However, what is significant about Judge Alsup’s
interpretation of each of the factors is that they appear to be a
liberal and lenient application of copyright law for software
development142 that are more in line with the goal of the fair use
doctrine to foster innovation.143 This application is something the
Federal Circuit has the potential to reinforce and continue, if not
expand. Additionally, the Federal Circuit could also set a trend for
the general order of importance for each of the four statutory
factors.

136

See supra Part IV. Section C.
Judge Alsup is the District Court judge who presided over the initial
Oracle v. Google case as well as the remanded case.
138
See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 12-19.
139
Id. at 18.
140
See id.
141
See supra Part II.
142
See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 18; see also infra Part V. Section A.2.
143
See Richard Stim, What Is Fair Use?, STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES:
COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/what-isfair-use/(last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (noting that the rationale behind the fair use
doctrine is to allow the public to benefit from the improvement of the
copyrighted work).
137
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Like the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, Alsup believed the
fourth factor to be the “single most important statutory factor” but
noted it is “not necessarily dispositive” and “must be weighed with
all other factors.”144 The analysis must consider the extent to which
the accused work can be a substitute or replacement for the
copyrighted work, as well as the likelihood of future market
harm.145 For this factor to weigh in favor of fair use, the accused
work should not “materially impair[] the marketability or value of
the copyrighted work.”146
For the first factor (purpose), Judge Alsup appeared to focus
most on the transformative nature of the use rather than if the use
was commercial.147 He conceded that whether the use was
commercial is also an element of the factor, but noted all parties
agreed the purpose of the use was commercial.148 Judge Alsup was
very liberal in his definition of “transformative.”149 While he stated
the use must add something new, Judge Alsup defined the term
transformative to include using the copyrighted work in a different
context without being required to change the elements in any other
way.150
Again, like the Supreme Court in Harper & Row, for the third
factor (amount), Judge Alsup put emphasis on the qualitative
amount of copyrighted work used rather than the quantitative
144

See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 18.
Id. at 18-19.
146
Id. at 18.
147
See id. at 14.
148
Id.
149
See id. at 13-14.
150
Id. at 13. A more conservative definition of “transformation” might require
some actual change to the work, rather than allowing for the work to be used in
a different context. Merriam-Webster defines transformations as “a complete or
major change in . . . something’s appearance, form, etc.” See Transformation,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/transformation (last visited Nov. 18, 2016). Because
Judge Alsup says a transformation only requires a change in context his
interpretation is more lenient and liberal. Final Charge, supra note 8, at 13 (“A
use is transformative if it adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character . . . .”).
145
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amount, even concluding “the total number of lines [of code] in
Android is irrelevant.”151 He went further, allowing some wiggle
room for qualitative copying, but only to the extent that it would
facilitate a transformative use and that the extent related to the
purpose and character of use in the first statutory factor
(purpose).152
While he appeared to emphasize least on the second statutory
factor (nature), Judge Alsup followed an interpretation similar to
that of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.153 The jury
instructions insinuated that the jury should apply the AFC test,
which implied juror analysis should hinge on whether the work is
creative or functional, with functional weighing in favor of fair
use.154
2. Why the Charged Interpretations Should Be Affirmed
The Federal Circuit should affirm Judge Alsup’s interpretation
and application of the statutory factors for two main reasons. First,
under Judge Alsup’s interpretations set out in the jury instructions,
the law would be more lenient and favorable to programmers,
focusing more on a functional rather than formal analysis. A
functional analysis allows for flexibility in characterization—
accounting for realities in the field—whereas a formal analysis is
more likely to adhere to the letter of the law. Computer
programming is dynamic in nature, as evidenced by the number of
open source projects running on sites like GitHub.155 The
151

See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 17.
Id.
153
Sega Enters. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th 1992).
154
See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 15-16.
155
See Open Source, GITHUB, https://github.com/open-source (last visited Oct
25, 2016); see also Sarah Jeong, Why the Very Silly Oracle v. Google Trial
Actually Matters, MOTHERBOARD (May 25, 2016, 6:10 PM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-the-very-silly-oracle-v-google-trialactually-matters (implying a functional analysis better aligns with Google’s—
and other developers’—reasons for using APIs, stating “APIs are highly
functional” and that “[a] screwdriver looks like a screwdriver because it has to,”
using the screwdriver analogy to explain why the Java APIs in the Android OS
look the way they do: they have to) (emphasis added); infra Part V. Section B.1.
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instructions appear to demonstrate that Google’s use of the Java
APIs aligns with the collaborative, functional nature of software
development.156 Second, initiating a trend of consistency could lead
to results that are more predictable and subsequently, a better
understanding of how copyright law should be applied to software
code.
For this case, Google argued that its actions had no bearing on
Oracle’s market for Java, but rather, that any failures were
“attributable to [Oracle’s] own actions or inaction . . . .”157 On
multiple occasions, Oracle and Sun both failed to adopt Java for
mobile devices—at times due to insufficient functionality—even
utilizing the same APIs at issue in this case.158 Additionally,
Google argued that the evidence showed that not only did using its
own implementing code for the thirty-seven Java APIs change
elements of the copyrighted work, but it also put the APIs into a
different context.159 This was transformative, even according to
Oracle’s own employees.160
Furthermore, Google noted that the nature of its use of the
declaring code and SSO was mainly functional, stating “[the
APIs’] predominant purpose is simply to allow access to the prewritten code in the API packages and thereby allow for the
practical use of the Java programming language.”161 Demonstrating
the functionality of the code, Google stated that “[the thirty-seven]
Java . . . API packages and their organization are . . . oftentimes
needed to make practical use of the Java programming
language.”162 To give further evidence in favor of the nature of the
copyrighted work, Google addressed the fact that Sun made Java
available under a free open source license,163 which “permitted
156

See infra Part V. Section B.
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 1, 10.
158
Id.
159
See id. at 10.
160
Id.
161
See id.
162
Id. at 8.
163
Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 8. In this instance, Java was
released as part of a platform called “OpenJDK.” See Google’s Trial Brief,
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licensees to subset or superset the Java . . . API packages, thereby
enabling exactly the sort of fragmentation that [Oracle] claims to
be damaged by.”164
Google’s arguments appear to fit well into the statutory
interpretations laid out by Judge Alsup in his instructions to the
jury.165 For factor four (market effect), Google and Judge Alsup
both have a common understanding that the market effect relates to
the manner in which the copyrighted material was used.166 Google
used the Java APIs for a mobile OS, and Oracle did not have a
mobile OS,167 thus there was no market for Google’s use to affect.
This is a pragmatic approach to looking at market effect, as
opposed to Oracle’s formal approach.168 In calculating damages for
harm, Oracle attempted to include everything the Java code was
involved in.169
supra note 79, at 10. OpenJDK, and by extension the Java code included in the
platform, was released under the GPLv2 license with a ClassPath Exception. See
OpenJDK FAQ, OPENJDK (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.openjdk.java.net/faq.
GPLv2 permits the licensee to use, copy, modify, and distribute the program’s
source code provided, among other requirements, the licensee releases the
source code upon distribution. See GNU General Public License, version 2, with
the
Classpath
Exception,
OPENJDK,
http://www.openjdk.java.net/legal/gplv2+ce.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
164
Id.
165
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 9-10; see also Final Charge,
supra note 9, at 14-19.
166
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 10; see also Final Charge, supra
note 9, at 18-19.
167
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 10.
168
See id. at 12-14.
169
See id. (describing Mr. Malackowski’s—Oracle’s expert—damage
calculations). Mr. Malackowski’s damage calculations totaled $8.8 billion for
everything he felt Google’s use of the Java APIs affected, including: attracting
developers who continued to develop more apps; apps that drew in customers;
apps that inspired searches on Android devices, which generated “Androidrelated revenue”; sales of hardware that run Android; sales of apps on Android
devices; sales of “digital content that Android device uses can download”
(emphasis added); and advertising revenues generated from web searches
performed on an Android phone. See id. at 12. This calculation was done
without any supporting evidence or analysis demonstrating that the thirty-seven
APIs in question caused or enabled any of the profit streams above. See id. Mr.
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For factor one (purpose), again Judge Alsup and Google were
on the same page, honing in on the transformative nature, rather
than the commercial nature of the use.170 While it behooved Google
to direct attention away from the commercial nature of the use, an
interpretation of factor one that is more focused on the
transformative nature could reward innovation, permitting the
public to benefit from technological advancements that may utilize
building blocks like the declaring codes of the Java APIs. After all,
it is with the use of those Java APIs that Google was able to
develop Android, which currently dominates the smartphone OS
market.171
The pattern of parallel thinking between Judge Alsup and
Google continued with factor two, which addressed the nature of
the work.172 When certain APIs and SSOs are required for practical
use, it would inhibit progress to prevent usage of those necessary
elements. Additionally, when the code is released to the general
public for use following a relatively unrestricted open-source
license, the code, and subsequently Google’s use of that code,
comports with the collaborative nature of the software industry and
the functional interpretation set out by Judge Alsup.
Google, Judge Alsup, and the jury all appear to understand that
the purpose of a fair use defense is to promote technological
innovation. There is, however, no guarantee that the Federal
Circuit will set any standards according to Judge Alsup’s
interpretations of the statutory factors. There is not even a
guarantee that the Federal Circuit will not reverse the jury verdict.
Malackowski even argued that requiring that analysis “would be impermissible
and irrelevant.” Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 12. Mr. Malackowski’s
damage calculations demonstrate a formalistic analysis of the fourth statutory
factor (market effect), which goes against the idea of innovation through
collaboration demonstrated by many software developers.
170
See id. at 9-10; see also Final Charge, supra note 9, at 14.
171
See Smartphone OS Market Share, 2016 Q2, IDC, (Aug. 2016)
www.idc.com/prodserv/smartphone-os-market-share.jsp (“Android dominated
the market with an 87.6% share in 2016Q2.”).
172
See Google’s Trial Brief, supra note 80, at 10; see also Final Charge to the
Jury, supra note 9, at 15-17.
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Reversing the jury verdict could have detrimental effects for both
copyright law and the fair use test, as well as for the software field.
B. What Reversing the Verdict Could Mean
Having addressed the district court’s interpretations of the
statutory factors and why the Federal Circuit should affirm the
jury’s verdict,173 it is necessary to now examine the potential
consequences of the alternative result of Oracle’s appeal. This
section theorizes possible outcomes of a reversal by the Federal
Circuit of the district court’s verdict, focusing on (1) how it may
affect copyright law and (2) how it may affect the software
industry.
1.

Effect on Copyright Law
It is necessary to first address the precedential impact of a
reversal. The Federal Circuit’s decision may end up having a low
precedential impact because the Federal Circuit is not the court that
would normally hear a copyright case.174 As stated above,175 this
case only went to the Federal Circuit because there was a patent
infringement claim initially involved, and the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction for appeals of patent cases.176 Additionally,
the Federal Circuit applied Ninth Circuit law.177 Because the
Federal Circuit is neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court,
it does not have the final say on how to interpret Ninth Circuit law.
There may be minimal change in how the law is actually
interpreted and applied. To start with, the outcome of the appeal
173

See supra Part V. Section A.
Unless brought before the United States Court of Federal Claims—which
does get appealed to the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3)—a
copyright infringement claim brought in federal district court would follow like
any other case brought in federal district court: an appeal to the respective
circuit court, potentially followed by an appeal to the Supreme Court. See
generally, Sega Enters. V. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th 1992); Harper &
Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Mullin, supra note 129.
175
See supra Part IV.Section B.
176
See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2015).
177
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
174
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will not affect the copyrightability of the literal and non-literal
elements of APIs because the Federal Circuit’s determination on
that matter stands and will not be overturned.178 Because APIs will
still be copyrightable until a court with binding authority (the
Ninth Circuit or the Supreme Court in this case) says otherwise,
that is the way copyrightability must be interpreted.179 Due to the
potentially low binding or persuasive authority of the Federal
Circuit, a case before the Ninth Circuit on the copyrightability of
APIs could overturn the Federal Circuit’s decision with respect to
the Ninth Circuit, rendering any discussion stemming from this
case relatively moot.
Additionally, the scope of the case is narrow—focusing only
on whether Google’s use of the declaring code and SSO of the Java
APIs was fair.180 Because a fair use defense is fact dependent, a
reversal in this case may simply mean that under these particular
facts, the Federal Circuit did not believe that Google’s use of the
Java APIs was fair. A reversal would not inherently invalidate
another entity’s use of the Java APIs, or any APIs in general.
Furthermore, there may not be any increased risk of litigation.
Again, a reversal would not be saying that no actor would have a
fair use defense for use of APIs, only that Google did not. Actors
copying implementing code, declaring code, or SSOs of APIs
could still be subject to copyright infringement claims, just as they
could be now. Larger, more commercialized actors will still need
to tread carefully with regard to their use of such code, and may
only have a marginally larger target on their back due to a
potentially perceived boost this case could give to a plaintiff’s
complaint. On the other hand, smaller actors and average users
may not actually feel any additional pressure from larger
companies. This is not to say that the smaller actors would not face
any litigation risk, but rather that they may not be at any greater
178

The copyrightability stands because it was not at issue in this case, see
Final Charge, supra note 9, at 11, thus it is not reviewable by the Federal
Circuit.
179
See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1358-59.
180
See Final Charge, supra note 9, at 11.
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risk from larger companies than they already are because the cost
of litigation may outweigh the recovery.
To the extent its opinion would be binding or persuasive, the
Federal Circuit could have the potential to negatively shape
copyright law as it applies to software. Regardless of whether the
Federal Circuit reverses the jury verdict or not, it will likely lay out
an interpretation of the four statutory factors of fair use doctrine, as
appellate courts generally do when presented with a test. It is
possible the Federal Circuit’s interpretations could line up with
those of Judge Alsup, but find that the evidence in the record
points in a different direction. However, it is equally likely that the
Federal Circuit could focus on and give different weight to other
factors that do not line up with those emphasized by Judge
Alsup.181
On the other hand, a possible consequence of the Federal
Circuit developing its own factor interpretations is that it could
restrict what constitutes fair use, strengthening copyright law. This
could result in analytically bad law. Concerning technology,
analytically bad law is law that would seem to comport with
statutory language, but is largely impractical in real world
application.182 It would contradict how the field it is governing
actually functions.183
For example, a shift from analyzing the first statutory factor
based on a transformative nature to focusing solely on whether a
use is commercial could have a strong negative impact on
innovation. In the technology world, the big name companies are
commonly the ones with the most money to spend on
advancements and innovations. They have the most money, in part,
181

See supra Part V. Section A.1.
See Sarah Jeong, In Oracle v. Google, a Nerd Subculture Is on Trial,
MOTHERBOARD (May 12, 2016, 2:46 PM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/ingoogle-v-oracle-the-nerds-are-getting-owned (discussing how the issue is being
decided by people who do not understand APIs).
183
See Jonathan Band, The Federal Circuit’s Poorly Reasoned Decision In
Oracle v. Google, PROJECT DISCO (May 9, 2014), http://www.projectdisco.org/intellectual-property/050914-the-federal-circuits-poorly-reasoneddecision-in-oracle-v-google/#.V_AZEsmXrh4.
182

28

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 1

because they are commercializing at least some of their work
product. Focusing on whether a use was commercial rather than
how transformative that use may have been disregards potential
benefits the public might gain from the improvement. It is
relatively easy to classify work product coming out of a larger
company like Google as commercial, because they are a business,
and have shareholders and investors to whom they answer. In the
2012 trial, Google stated that “[n]obody is claiming that Google
created Android as part of a charitable mission. The evidence is
pretty clear that they created it to provide a platform on which
other Google products could do better.”184 However, there are
technological benefits to such development, as demonstrated by
Android’s market dominance.185 Performing a more formal analysis
that focuses on the commercial aspect as Oracle implored,186 rather
than looking at the transformative nature of the disputed work,
provides an easily checked box against the defendant regardless of
societal gains.
It is difficult to predict how the Federal Circuit may interpret
the different statutory factors upon review or if that ruling will
have any influence on other courts. However, to the extent the
Federal Circuit offers different interpretations and other courts are
influenced by the Federal Circuit’s decision, shifting
interpretations toward example above could lead to real world
consequences, such as a debilitating effect on the software
industry.
2.

Effect on the Software Industry
Other than the law becoming outdated and more stringent,
consequences of a reversal of the jury verdict could include a
debilitated software industry and diminished innovation. When the
Federal Circuit first decided that APIs were copyrightable, the

184

See Oracle’s Trial Brief at 3, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. C-1003561 WHA (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2016).
185
See Smartphone OS Market Share, supra note 171 (“Android dominated
the market with an 87.6% share in 2016Q2.”).
186
See Oracle’s Trial Brief, supra note 184, at 3.
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software industry was confused.187 The notion of copyrighting nonliteral elements and literal elements like method declaration did not
correspond with the general expectations of developers.188 Most
developers wrote code for others in the industry to use, furthering
collaboration and technological progress.189 Suddenly, the Federal
Circuit had put a potential limitation on that collaboration and
progress.190 A reversal by the Federal Circuit of the jury verdict on
fair use could magnify that confusion and uncertainty.
In some ways, the outcome of an appeal to the Federal Circuit
will have little to no bearing on the software world. Damage was
done with the first appeal to the Federal Circuit, in which the court
held declaring code and SSOs of APIs were copyrightable.191 As
stated above, an appeal of the fair use defense is not going to
change that fact, so developers will still have to be cognizant of
that for now. Additionally, as stated above, the independent
developers and collaborative teams are unlikely to feel any
litigation pressure, at least from powerhouses like Oracle, who are
only seeking big damages.
However, a reversal may, to the detriment of independent and
smaller developers, provide an environment for bad-faith

187

See e.g., Jeong, supra note 182 (“Google’s nerd witnesses are hamstrung
on their ability to explain the motivations behind their actions, because . . . no
one thought the Java APIs were copyrightable.”); Jared Newman, Here’s The
Scariest Thing About The Oracle-Google Software Copyright Battle, FAST
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opportunists to take advantage of the industry.192 This environment
would most likely be the result of a more formalistic interpretation
of the statutory factors for a fair use defense. As mentioned above,
a formalistic approach can, in some cases, provide easily checked
boxes for plaintiffs. While it may not be certain that a decision by
the Federal Circuit would have any precedential influence to a
court, that precedent is not necessarily required for those bad-faith
opportunists to be successful; the presence of those easy-to-check
boxes may be all the ammunition needed. A potential market for
copyright trolls193 and licensing businesses could grow from
weakened fair use defenses and strict enforcement of copyrights of
things like declaring codes and SSOs.194
These licensing businesses would most likely behave like
patent trolls, which are non-practicing entities that buy up patent
portfolios, and as with copyright trolls, their sole aim is to find
people to sue for infringement and make money on subsequent
settlements.195 Unwitting independent developers and users, who
might not even know they needed a license, could be subjected to
strong-armed licensing agreements to avoid being taken to court. If
those users or developers are not legally sophisticated they may not
know that the Federal Circuit’s opinion could potentially have little
weight at trial. At the same time, regardless of sophistication and
being taken advantage of, they may want to avoid the costs, time,
and effort associated with trials.
To shield themselves and downstream recipients from
copyright trolls, independent and smaller developers who intended
their programs and modifications to be freely distributed and used
may need to do extra work. Developers who want their programs
192
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to be freely used would need to go back through their work and
ensure that any technology, such as declaring code and SSOs of
APIs, are wholly their own, or are appropriately licensed under a
proprietary or open-source license.196 Additionally, the developers
would need to publicly announce inclusion of the licenses in their
code so the downstream users would know of the license
requirements.197 This can be an insurmountable task. For example,
one site that hosts open-source programming projects is GitHub.198
GitHub allows for free collaboration on any number of projects,
and there are millions of projects hosted.199 A single developer
could have contributed to any number of projects, which would
require a search through each line of code in each project to verify
the correct license is attached. Such an undertaking could be
impracticable.
Additionally, the work-around requirements for those software
programs that utilize Java APIs could be substantially detrimental
to interoperability.200 New methods may need to be developed and
redistributed to get those utilizing Java APIs back to the level of
compatibility and efficiency at which development is currently
operating.201 Java took at least four years from its conception to
break through into the public spotlight and had been continuing to
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grow for a total of fifteen years by the time Google began to
develop the Android OS.202 While technological growth has been
increasing annually, there is still the potential for a heavy workload
to return to the level of interoperability that Java provided.
VI.
CONCLUSION
The current state of software copyright law is murky, but the
Federal Circuit has an opportunity to clear things up. There are
potential benefits should the Federal Circuit affirm the jury verdict.
An affirmation could result in continued, if not more, lenient
interpretations of the statutory factors, employing a functional—
rather than formalistic—analysis. This would create copyright law
that focuses more on permitting innovation. Additionally, an
affirmation could initiate a potential order of importance of those
statutory factors. Because of these benefits, as well as the evidence
presented by Google, the Federal Circuit should affirm the District
Court’s ruling.
A reversal, however, could go either way with respect to legal
effects. There could be no major legal effects due to the potentially
low precedential influence the Federal Circuit has on other courts.
Although less likely, the decision could also be detrimental in
prompting a stricter, more formalistic approach to fair use.
Regardless of the precedent the Federal Circuit may or may not set
for other courts, there still could be damaging effects to the
software industry, where reality and practice can be independent of
a court’s interpretation of certain laws. Copyright trolls,
widespread uncertainty, and diminished innovation could befall the
industry as a result of ambiguity created by a reversal of the district
court’s holding. These are harms that should be recognized as
being bigger than the case itself. Their potential impact on the
industry should outweigh what Oracle hopes to gain in a victory
over Google. The Federal Circuit has the opportunity to set a
positive example, and it should take that opportunity, rather than
handicapping an entire industry.
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